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REASON, REVELATION, UNIVERSALITY AND
PARTICULARITY IN ETHICS
JOHN FINNIs

Any jurisprudential, moral or political theory that affirms natural law needs
to respond first to skeptical denials that reason can discover any truths about
what ends all human individuals or groups ought to pursue. But any such
theory also needs to make clear how it differs from, even when it coincides in
moral judgment with, bodies of moral teaching self-identified as part of a
divine revelation addressed to everyone. It also needs to show how truths of
natural law provide grounds for rejecting, as well as for accepting, particular
human claims to be the bearer of such a universal revelation. Parts I to I
below address these issues through a critical examination of some contemporary philosophizing which, while acknowledging the warranted universality
of the predicate "is true," withhold that predicate from the principles of
practical reason. Parts IV and V address another aspect of universality and
particularity about which natural law theory needs to get clear: how the moral
norms of natural law, properly as universal as human nature and the
community of all people and peoples, nonetheless warrant unyielding loyalty
to specific communities, above all one's country and one's marital family.

I
When Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy was published in
2002, Princeton University Press described its author Bernard Williams as
Britain's greatest living philosopher, and today, five years after his death, the
biography at Wikipedia begins with the thought that he was "the most
important British moral philosopher of his time." The last philosophical
publication of my own mentor in Oxford, H.L.A. Hart, was a penetrating
review of Williams's Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Both men had
studied philosophy in what was then the Oxford way: first Plato and Aristotle,
firsthand, by close and critical argumentation, and only then the Enlightenment and the modems. Each of them, though Williams much the more
extensively, gave whole lecture courses on Plato; though unusually familiar
with the origins of our philosophy, each of them can be taken as representative
of the methods and opinions characteristic of philosophy as it is being
practiced among us today. In that review of Williams's 1985 book, Hart
endorsed Williams's opinion that ethics and morality have no rational
foundations: for some "thick" ethical predicates-such as "is courageous" or
"was cruel"-a particular culture has defined what facts make it correct,
within that culture, to predicate courage or cruelty of some person, deed or
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disposition; but there are no more general, or universal, truths in ethics, nor
any moral truths about what is obligatory or right or wrong.'
The "project" of Williams's 2002 book is announced in these terms: "to
see how far the values of truth could be revalued, how they might be
understood in a perspective quite different from the Platonic and Christian
metaphysics which had provided their principal source in the West up to
now."2 The occasion for the "revaluation" of the "values of truth" is what
Williams calls the "pervasive suspicion about truth itself... [and about]
whether we should bother about it," a suspicion that is "very prominent in
modem thought and culture." 3 And so the book begins with a fairly vigorous
and successful brief deployment of what is, though Williams does not say so,
the classical dialectic against skeptical deniers of the existence (and therefore
the value) of truth,4 the dialectic which unfolds by showing how such denials
refute themselves, rely upon what they deny, "peck... into dust the only tree
that will support them."5 The later chapters follow a method that Williams
ascribes essentially to David Hume, and involve both imaginary and historical
genealogies intended to show how "very basic human needs and limitations,
notably the need for cooperation, ' are such that "every society not only needs
there to be dispositions of [the] kind [summed by Williams as the virtues of
Accuracy and Sincerity] but needs them to have a value that is not purely
functional [but rather is intrinsic]." 7 And in this argumentation, which is
indeed, as Williams says, "an example of philosophy,"' there is embedded the
striking and reiterated thesis that "[t]he concept of truth itself-that is to say,
the quite basic role that truth plays in relation to language, meaning, and
belief-is not culturally various, but always and everywhere the same."9
Everybody everywhere already has a concept oftruth, indeed, they all have the
same concept of truth."l (The fact that they may have very different theories
1. See Finnis, "On Hart's Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact," American Journal of
Jurisprudence52 (2007): 25-53,47-50; also in The Legacy ofH.L.A. Hart:Legal,Politicaland
Moral Philosophy,ed. Matthew Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn and Antony Hatzistavrou
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
2. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002), 18.
3.Ibid., 1.
4.See ibid., 5.
5.Ibid., 19.
6.Ibid., 38.
7.Ibid., 42, with 44 and 59.
8.Ibid., 39.
9.Ibid., 61.
10. To avoid misunderstandings, note that this sense inwhich "truth isauniversal concept,"
while important to an understanding of human capacities, is of less interest to the questions
considered in this paper than a sense which is quite different (even though it presupposes the
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of truth just shows how much people's theories of truth misrepresent their
grasp of the concept.")" For instance, "all human beings everywhere have
understood that some statements about what has recently happened (for
instance, what has just happened) are true," "simply true."' 2 And this
universal concept involves thinking of truth as valuable:
Genuinely asking a question, wondering how things stand, I aim at a true answer.
Assertions can be assessed for truth, and they would not be assertions if they
could not. The assessment of beliefs and assertions as true is a favourable one
... to that extent we can see that truth must be regarded as a value. 3
Just to what extent, truth is a value-whether it is of intrinsic value for its own
sake-Williams leaves to later. For the moment let us stay with his dialectical
critique of skepticism.
Part of it is an effort to minimize the skepticism of Friedrich Nietzsche, for
whose ethical positions Williams had much sympathy, but whose wider
positions many of the post-modem deniers "take... to be that we should give
up on the value of truth altogether."' 4 Williams quotes late writings of
Nietzsche to show that, even at "the very end of his active life," he was
dedicated to "the value of truthfulness [, which] embraces the need to find out
the truth, to hold on to it, and to tell it-in particular, to oneself."' 5
Williams's estimate of Nietzsche's dedication makes light of the counterevidence afforded by Nietzsche's own frivolous playing, quite truculent about
self-contradiction, with "the value of truth" (Nietzsche's phrase before
Williams) in the third part of On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), 16 the work
universal human capacity to understand and predicate "is true"), namely, that it is a "mark of
truth," one which we advert to when we understand that to assert that "p is true" is to imply
one's belief that under ideal epistemic conditions everyone would concur in that judgment: see
the discussion of David Wiggins's explorations of truth, in Finnis, Fundamentalsof Ethics

(Oxford and Washington, DC: Oxford University Press and Georgetown University Press,
1983), 63-6.
11. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 163. See also 276: "the richness and complexity of
the archaic [Greek] truth vocabulary does not mean that the concept of truth, as we would
recognize it, is absent. Indeed, it is only in the light of its presence, the fact that people in this
culture stated things as true, questioned whether they were true, passed them on as true, and so
on, that we can understand what this rich vocabulary means."
12. Ibid., 160.
13. Ibid., 84. Williams proceeds immediately to insist that this leaves entirely open the
question whether telling the truth is a value.
14. Ibid., 13.
15. Ibid.
16. See Finnis, "Retribution: Punishment's Formative Aim," American Journal of
Jurisprudence44 (1999): 91-103, 94.
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from which Williams takes both the subtitle of his book on truth and the name
(and not merely the name) for the method of his project.
And takes, indeed, his project itself. For Williams says it was Nietzsche's
project, to which he, Williams, will "in this book... try to contribute."' 7 The
reason why Williams's statement of the project refers to "the Platonic and
Christian metaphysics" is found in the passage he had just quoted from
Nietzsche:
[I]t is still a metaphysicalfaithupon which our faith in science rests ... even we
knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from
the flame lit by the thousand-year-old faith, the Christian faith which was also
Plato's faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine."B
"Truth is divine" is a too high-flown and opaque formula for something that
Plato takes care to articulate more soberly and intelligibly in the parts of his
dialogue Republic that Williams discusses more than once in Truth and
Truthfulness. These are the parts whose centre is the great parable or eikon
of the Cave in which one man is suddenly freed from a chained-up group who
have all spent their lives looking at the shadows cast on the cave's back wall
by artifacts which, unknown to the prisoners, are being carried back and forth
between the prisoners and a fire which is burning far above and behind them,
much nearer the cave's entrance. The man freed is turned around and made
to look first at the fire and then compelled to make his way right up to the
cave's entrance and into the sunlight. There he sees for the first time the light
of the sun, ultimate source of the shadows, the fire and artifacts that cast those
shadows, and of the moon and stars outside the cave--cause, that is, of
everything that this man and his fellows had ever seen (in any sense of seen).' 9
And then Plato has Socrates make the decisive affirmation that is the point of
the whole parable: just as the sun stands to sight and visible things, as source
of their visibility but also of their coming to be, growth, nourishment, so "the
good itself," the very "Form of the Good," stands to understanding and
intelligible things, as source of the being (reality) of what we understand and
source of all our understanding of it.2" "What gives truth to the things known
and the power to know to the knower is the Form of the Good [tou agathou

17. Truth and Truthfulness, 18.
18. Truth and Truthfulness, 14, quoting Nietzsche, The Gay Science [1882], trans. Josefine
Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 344.
19. Rep. VII.514a-517b, esp. 516c with VI.508b-509b.
20. Rep. VI.508b.
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idean]" (one might say, to capture this use of "Form," the very archetype of
all goodness and reality). 2
Now it is true that Plato sometimes-for example in the very next sentence
-exaggerates the difference between what is purely intelligible, like geometry, and the empirical, material things that are "mixed with obscurity" because
they come to be and pass away. Aristotle had reason to insist more steadily
on the extent to which material things are intelligible through the forms that
are intrinsicto them. In doing so, he was only drawing out what Plato himself
plainly implies in his last dialogue, The Laws, when he discusses the natural,
empirical world as a domain not of mere brute fact and chance but of the art
and providence of "God who is supremely wise, and willing and able to
superintend the world,"22 a world of beings whose movements are saturated
in intelligibility, "the cause of their changes lying within themselves."23
But to Williams, though he is credibly reported to have regarded Plato as
the greatest of all philosophers, the theses Plato was intimating with the Sun
and the Cave are thoroughly objectionable. (i) Plato's "account of the Form
of the Good in the Republic" associated truth with goodness in a way which
represents them as "altogether prior to a human interest in them," indeed as
"in themselves entirely independent of our thoughts and attitudes,"24 so that
(ii) Williams "can only suppose, with Nietzsche, that such views, precisely in
their obliteration of human interests, must be an expression of human
interests"2 5 (by which Nietzsche meant, of course, discreditable, twisted
human interests such as self-lacerating guilt, malicious entrapment of the
strong by the slavish, resentful weak, and so forth: the shameful, deflating
genealogy of conscience and morality itself). (iii) To understand the intrinsic
goodness of truth we should "consider only certain human attitudes toward the
truth, people's dispositions to discover it and express it," so that our inquiry
has "a naturalistic outlook" and so "should be seen as an exercise in human
self-understanding."26 It is only relative to such attitudes and dispositions
which people happen to have that we can speak of human "needs";2 7 calling
a need "basic" and "human" does not override this relativity to desire.28 (iv)
21. Rep. VI.508e.
22. Laws X.902e-903a.
23. Laws X.904c; the argument unfolds from 888e to 905d. And see Rep. VII.530a on "the
craftsman of the heavens" who "arranged [the stars and their motions] and all that's in [the
heavens]."
24. Truth and Truthfulness, 61.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 60.
27. See text at n. 6 above.
28. On the Humean character of Williams's conception of basic reasons for action and of
basic values, see John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
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Instead, Plato's "suggestion [with the Sun and the Cave and the Republic as
a whole] is that real beauty and value are not to be found in this world at all,
and that what is here is only some image or association of them; it is as though
the world contained a photograph in place of a lover .... ""
These four claims quite misconceive a text that is foundational for our
civilization and among the most important of Providence's preparations for
the reception of Christian revelation 400 years later. Take point (iv). There
are many good and beautiful things in this world, says Plato right here: start
the list with knowledge and truth themselves.3" Their source, what they are
due to, is the Form of the Good-the good, divine3 good-which is more
beautiful and more valuable than they or any other good. So when Plato calls
knowledge and truth images of the good--"goodlike" or "boniform"
[agathoeide-thesense of "image" is very remote from the static, lifeless
photograph substituted for the lover. The images he is talking about are
present particular realities, items, of knowing, rightness, justness, understanding and so forth, each and all being caused-authored or "controlled and
provided"--by that of which they are likenesses.32 By treating a photo as the
relevant paradigm of an image, Williams shows how remote he and many like
him have become from what Genesis and St Paul hold out to us as revealed:
that human persons are each an image and likeness of their divine author,33
and that indeed, as Thomas Aquinas explains, each created reality is a likeness
of God, "approaching that likeness more perfectly if it is not only good but
also can act for the benefit of others. 34
So, though the divine cause is "in itself entirely independent of our
thoughts and attitudes," as point (i) asserts, it is considered and discussed by
Plato and the whole philosophical and theological tradition precisely as what
causally enables us to think (most thoroughly when our thoughts are true) and
supports and makes best sense of our attitudes when they are just and right.
Even when Plato is most unbalanced in ways that Aristotle and Christianity
correct, his account cannot truthfully be said (as point (ii) says) to "obliterate"
human interests. His concern, in the Republic, with the divine things there
[1993] 1996), 85 n. 33.; Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," Journalof
Philosophy83 (1986) 5-25, 19-23.
29. Ibid., 143 with its endnote at 205. "Elsewhere" than in the Republic, says Williams
(143), pointing to the Symposium, Plato more truthfully suggests that real beauty and value are
indeed to be found here in this world "but only in an incomplete, never entirely satisfactory
form.",
30. Rep. VI.508e.
31. See Rep. VII.516c.
32. Rep. VII.516b ("cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything").
33. Genesis 1: 26-27; Acts 17:28; Colossians 3: 10; cf. Romans 8: 29.
34. Aquinas, Summa contragentiles II, c. 45, n. 2.
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envisaged and in some measure affirmed is with their significance as making
sense of all the realities with which moral thought and political life are
concerned-as providing a model [paradeigma]to those persons who "see"
these divine things, a model for the putting-in-order of their political community, of its citizens, and of themselves," which these persons are to
accomplish, or at least attempt, by sharing in their fellow citizens' labors,
great and small,36 including their law-making and above all their educative
undertakings.37
So, as to point (iii), Plato will say that a truly "naturalistic" attempt to
understand truth and knowledge will indeed be "an exercise in human selfunderstanding" which will only go well if it relates and extends self-understanding both to its sources, more and less remote, and (even before that) to
the objects of human understanding. I have started with these difficult matters
of divine causality and its dependent images and analogues because
Williams's uncomprehending dismissal of them helps explain the oversights
which facilitate the subjectivism or scepticism of his ethics, the ethics of so
many whose truncated, "naturalistic," self-understanding is that of "we
knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians."
n
"The values of truth," for Williams are "Sincerity and Accuracy," which he
everywhere calls "virtues of truth." Here I shall say nothing about Sincerity,
and look only to Accuracy. It is a great intellectual virtue. But, as Williams
never recognizes, it is necessarily a secondary element in the disposition or
desire to have true beliefs. More primary is curiosity, the desire to learn, to
find out.3 And most primary is the insight that knowledge is a good, pursuitworthy for its own sake, and ignorance-not just error but also and more
fundamentally ignorance-issomething to be avoided. Having this insight is
in every way prior to, and foundational for, intellectual virtues such as
accuracy. And it is an insight we gain, not by reading books which like
Aquinas's discourse on natural law identify this insight's content as a first and
self-evident principle of practical reason and natural law, but by advancing
from our own experience. What experience, and what advance?

35.
36.
37.
38.

Rep. VII.540a.
Rep. VII.519d, 520d.
Rep. VII.519e and 518b-c, 521c, 525b-c, 526e, 532c, 540a-c.
And so Aristotle puts this first, in the opening sentence of the Metaphysics1.1: 980a2 1.
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As children, we ask questions, and they get answered.39 Answers suggest
further questions, which in turn elicit answers we can understand as answers,
that is, satisfactory responses to the questions. At a certain point there comes
a step-change in our understanding; noticing how the answers hang together,
we have the insight that together they constitute knowledge, that, in other
words, our belief in these answers is justified and what we believe is true. It
is part of the same insight that future answers to future possible questions will
be further elements in this open-ended field, knowledge. So the core of the
insight is that knowledge, our coming to know what up to then we did not
know, is possible. This insight is not a deduction; in that sense it is not
reasoned to, though it is grounded in the lived experience of (a) puzzling
experience, (b) pertinent question and (c) satisfying answer confirmed or at
least not disconfirmed by experience. This insight, which becomes foundation
and framework for many other insights and trains of reasoning, is itself a first,
one of a number of such firsts, as we shall see. And usually, in the history of
one's intellectual development (our biographies), this primary insight is
accompanied or closely followed by another insight, equally in its own field
a first, not a conclusion of any reasoning from deeper premises: the insight
that knowledge is not simply a possibility but an advantage-adesirable,
beneficial possibility, a good thing, a kind of benefit, a way of being that is
better than being ignorant: one is better-off than if one's questions remained
unanswered. And this kind of possibility is understood as sometimes beneficial even when no further or other purpose seems to be served, or even capable
of being served, by gaining it. This first principle of practical reason, that
knowledge is beneficial-a good that is worthy of pursuit, that is, in other
words, to be pursued-isfoundation (principium,arche and framework for
practical thought about how to make good on the opportunity, how to realize
or actualize (achieve) it. The core of this thought is already normative: "is to
be pursued" means ought to be pursued, in a sense of "ought" that is not yet
moral (though it is incipiently moral). The desirability of this good, and
sometimes attainable, possibility is the source of this normativity.
In this insight, one understands the advantage of knowing as good bothfor
me and for anyone like me, anyone who like me asks or can or could ask
questions-the girl or boy in the next desk, for example, or, come to think of
it, girls or boys anywhere. As I say, this is not yet moral thinking. The
39. Here we could say a good deal more about the way in which (i) the answers given us
("It's hot! Careful!") are sufficiently often verified by our experience of or credible reports of
confirmatory events or phenomena, and (ii) our belief in these answers is shown to be justified
by those answers' coherence with each other and with the available answers to any further
relevant questions, and (iii) this in turn lends credibility to other answers from the same or
similar sources.
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normativity is not yet of the form "they ought to be seeking knowledge," or "I
ought to be helping them overcome their ignorance or confusion," but it is an
understanding, a recognition, that as I'm better-off overcoming my own
ignorance so they are better-off overcoming theirs.4"
That understanding can promptly be reinforced by another: it is good for
each of us if we are in such a relationship to each other that each wants the
other to be better-off, and finds some satisfaction or even joy in the other's (or
others') success (say, in overcoming ignorance or confusion). This further
insight, in other words, is that this sort of state of things between us really is
better than the state of things which obtains when each is coldly indifferent to
the other's (or others') success or failure, or when each of us wants the other's
misery, as the playground bully wants the misery and humiliation of his
victim. Like the insight into the good of knowledge, this further insight is
neither a deduction from any proposition, nor a data-free "intuition," but is
harmonious with certain sub-rational inclinations and feelings. Gaining the
insight stands, however, as a step-change in one's perception of reality and its
possibilities, possibilities now understood as advantages and benefits and
opportunities pursuit-worthy for their own sake. The intelligible good which
is the object (subject-matter) of this further insight we can label the good of
friendship, taking that term in its widest extension along the wide spectrum of
relationships, from concern to protect a passing stranger from imminent peril
in the mountains all the way to the many-sided, stable and loving friendship
of good and true friends.
The good of friendship is a common good, not simply my good to which
yours is good only as a means, nor your good to which mine is good only as
a means, but the good of our each flourishing in and by concern for and
promotion of the other's wellbeing for its own sake and for the sake of both
of us. Each instance of this sort of particular common good, whether it
involve two persons only or many more, is an instance of a universal human
opportunity, advantage, benefit: friendship. And the intelligibility ofthis kind
of common good both exemplifies and reinforces the intelligibility of each of
the other kinds of universal opportunity, each of the other aspects of human
wellbeing. For there are other aspects of human wellbeing, other basic
reasons for action, besides the two aspects and reasons I have been speaking
of, knowledge and friendship. There is, for example, the intelligible good of
40. As one learns that knowledge can be disturbing or distracting, and that many things are
hardly worth knowing, one does not conclude that knowledge is not a good in itself, or good
only for its utility as a means to satisfying other desires; rather, one concludes (or should
conclude) that its bad side-effects can be guarded against and/or worked-around, and that
knowledge which is strategic or fundamental is to be pursued in preference to trivialities that
may arouse curiosity or win a game.
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human life and health itself, and there is the good of transmitting human life
as parents of the offspring generated by that specific and specifically procreative friendship, the marriage of husband and wife, committed to being each of
their children's father and mother, jointly progenitors, educators and in due
measure lifelong companions.
The reasons which all these and the few other basic human goods give for
action cut across Bernard Williams's famous distinction between internal and
external reasons. For of all and each of them it is right to say that it would
give reason for action even to a person who happened to lack all (motivating)
responsiveness to it, all "subjective motivation" to pursue this kind of benefit,
and even if such responsiveness to this kind of benefit could not be "rationally
arrived at' from that person's existing motivations.42 Williams's arguments
against (what he calls) external reasons arbitrarily assume that there can be no
originating practical insight into the intrinsic advantage (benefit, opportunity
-intelligible good) offered by some kind(s) of possibility that experience and
(non-practical) understanding show to be attainable; these arguments thus ally
themselves with the unwarranted Humean dogma that reasons as such cannot
motivate. That dogma is inattentive to the variety of kinds of reasons there
are, and equally inattentive to the central human reality of human will as one's
capacity to respond to, be motivated by, the intelligible goods one understands, including goods understood as good for their own sake and not only
as means to something else, goods identified in the basic reasons for action,
41. "Internal and External Reasons" in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973-1980 (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 109. On the
distinction, see generally sec. 4 of Timothy Chappell, "Bernard Williams," The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/williams-bernard/>. A reason that fits the
description given summarily in this sentence of my text is, in Williams's terminology, "external"
(and in his view impossible). Williams's point (i) (Truth and Truthfulness, 61), complained,
in effect, that Plato treated the forms of the good as external reasons. For a decisive critique of
Williams's categorization of reasons as internal or external, see Korsgaard, "Skepticism about
Practical Reason."
42. Here I part companywith the critique ofWilliams's internal/external reasons arguments
which is advanced by Christopher Tollefsen, "Basic Goods, Practical Insight, and External
Reasons," in Human Values, ed. David Oderberg and Timothy Chappell (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2004), (and later entertained also by Chappell, "Bernard Williams)" just in so far as Tollefsen
relies on the position (which is Aquinas's) that "the starting points of correct deliberation are
sharedby all agents--the basic goods, plus the recognition of well-being as the point of action."
I do not doubt that this thesis is true of all agents of sufficient intelligence and maturity. But
I think it better not to try to explicate what a practical reason is by appealing to a fact such as
universal sharing of starting points. Basic goods and reasons for action are intelligible,without
reasoning, given only the experience and non-practical understanding of possibility which are
availableto virtually everyone.
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reasons accessible to everyone able to deliberate and choose. It should be
obvious that even though nothing is a practical reason if it could not motivate
a rational person, and though no-one is rational who lacks the capacity to be
motivated by reasons, it by no means follows-nor is it the case-that such
reasons do motivate everyone (or even anyone) on all occasions when they
might have; or that there is no-one who lacks the capacity to be motivated by
such reasons.43
Ethical thought, morality itself, has as its shaping object the good of being
directed in all one's choices and actions by the basic reasons for action,
undeflected by sub-rational motivations that would, without reason, cut back
on the directiveness of each and any of those basic reasons. That good of
practical reasonableness has as its propositional core the master principle of
morality (or ethics): that one have a will open to integral--one could say
universal-human fulfillment, the fulfillment of all human persons and
groups. Specific moral principles, such as the Golden Rule, have their
intelligibility and force as specifications of that master principle: for example,
just as one cannot have a will open to integral human fulfillment if one is
willing to inflict harm on others for the sake of harming them, so one cannot
have such a will if one is willing to do to others what one is not willing for
others to do to you. More specifically still, moral rules pick out ways in
which, for example, kinds of choice are wrong because, for example, such a
choice intends the destruction, damaging or impeding of a basic human good
in the life of one or more persons. Moral rules thus picking out kinds of act
that are exceptionlessly wrong identify those acts by their objects, that is their
close-in objectives, not by reference to their consequences or other circumstances. Such rules are thus exceptions to the generalization' that moral
reasoning becomes less certain as its propositions descend from high-level
universal principles towards specific conclusions about particular options
available in complex and imperfectly foreseeable or controllable circumstances. There are plenty of principles or rules identifying more or less
specific affirmative responsibilities, but the relatively few exceptionless moral
43. The points made in this sentence are well made, against Williams, by Korsgaard,
"Skepticism about Practical Reason," 11-25. See further Christine Korsgaard, "TheNormativity
of Instrumental Reasons," in Ethics andPracticalReason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 215-54; Finnis, "Foundations of Practical Reason
Revisited," American JournalofJurisprudence50 (2005): 109-31, 112-18, adopting Korsgaard's
critique of Humeanism but criticising her Kantian failure to move decisively beyond Humeanism,
a failure to attend to the practical reasons which direct us to basic human goods besides practical
reasonableness, goods such as knowledge, life and friendship.
44. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1-2 q. 94 a. 4c; Finnis,Aquinas:Moral,Political,and
Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 90-91.
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rules are all negative, identifying kinds of option always to be excluded from
one's deliberations.45 Wherever those inevitably wrong kinds of option bear
on the acting person's relations to another person or persons, those same
exceptionless negative norms, rules or precepts pick out the content of a
human right that is not only inalienable but also (to use the terminology of the
European Court of Human Rights)46 absolute, such as the right not to be
tortured.47
The moral truths I have been recalling in these broad brushstrokes are a
main part of what Bernard Williams called "the morality system," which-in
the book that Hart reviewed-he labeled scathingly "the peculiar institution"
(a euphemism once used in the American South to refer defensively to
slavery). Morality has, on Williams's account of it, nine or ten defining
features, each of which he attacks; his main criticisms have been assembled
from his writings by Timothy Chappell, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of

45. Affirmative moral rules, identifying choice-worthy kinds of option, apply semper sed
non adsemper(always relevant but not in all circumstances to be chosen); only negative moral
rules can be semper et ad semper (always relevant and in all circumstances to be followed).
The exclusion of inevitably wrongful options will characteristically, if not always, leave open
more than one option for choice, even if only the option of taking no action. See Aquinas, 1634.
46. See e.g. Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06. Council of Europe: European Court of
Human Rights, 28 February 2008. However, this unanimous decision of the Grand Chamber
runs together an absolute prohibition (exceptionless norm) with an absolute duty not to do
anything that might (as a matter of real risk) result in someone else violating that prohibition (or
the equivalent exceptionless moral or natural-law norm). That is, it obliterates the distinction
between intended results and side-effects which has been found necessary for the coherence of
sets of moral teachings which include exceptionless (absolute) negative norms: see Finnis,
MoralAbsolutes: Tradition,Revision, and Truth (Washington, DC, The Catholic University of
America Press, 1991), 67-74. The rule adopted in the case may be defensible on its merits (e.g.,
by a Miranda-likepolicy argument), at least in relation to "torture" as distinct from "degrading
treatment," although in relation to deportation where there is a risk of later torture but no
shadow of intent to subject the deportee to that risk or of collaboration with the potential
torturers, the non-absolute rule in Suresh v. Canada (2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 (Can.), at
para. 78 seems preferable. What is certain is that the rule in Saadi is not defensible as an
interpretation of the Convention's intended meaning or as an exposition of the logic of the
interpretative gloss-term "absolute." In terms of the last paragraph of the section "Absolute
Rights" in my NaturalLaw and NaturalRights, 225-6, the Court's argumentation (if not its
conclusory ruling) confuses a two-term with a three-term right.
47. Natural Law and Natural Rights, 224. For the derivation of a philosophically
defensible natural (human) right not to be tortured, identifying with some precision the kind of
act that counts as torture in warranted assertions of this right, and relating the right to basic
human goods, see Patrick Lee, "Interrogational Torture," American JournalofJurisprudence
51 (2006): 131-147.
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Philosophy," and you can see how strong in rhetoric and weak in refutatory
force they are. Most if not all of them simply assume the absence of any
substantive first principles of practical reason (and thus of moral reasonableness), such as are provided by the basic reasons for action that direct us
towards realizing the basic human goods in our own life and the lives of
others. In this assumption, nowhere (so far as I know) examined by Williams,
he shares the same utter detachment from and apparent unawareness of the
mainstream tradition (exemplified by Aquinas) as is displayed by Hobbes,
Locke, Hume, the Utilitarians, Kant and accordingly by most of yesterday's
and today's English-speaking philosophers. But equally-I have been
suggesting-what is missing is sufficient reflective awareness of certain
primary workings, and the foundational content, ofthe practical understanding
and reasoning available to all of us and manifested at least unreflectively in
the life of everyone who more or less rationally chooses. These substantive
first principles, directing us to substantive goods such as life, knowledge,
friendship, and so forth, provide genuinely "thick" practical predicates
between the wholly abstract or formal predicates "ought," "right," and "good"
and such morally laden and circumstance- and culture-relative predicates as
those Williams called thick (courage, cruelty and the like). But so far as I can
see these first principles and basic goods and reasons for action don't get a
mention, or a thought.
1II
Plato's work, not least the part I have mentioned, seemed to Christians in
the first few centuries of our era to be highly convergent with what the
revelation they believed to have been completed in Christ disclosed about
God's existence, nature and will-so convergent that some hypothesized
meetings or other communications between Plato and the prophet Jeremiah.
St. Augustine eventually concluded, in 416 A.D., that accurate computation
of dates precludes that particular connection. But he was deeply impressed
by the way in which Plato and his successors (first among them Aristotle)
went through and beyond natural science, epistemology and ethics to a
knowledge of God as cause of the organized universe, source of the light by50
which truth is perceived, and spring of human happiness and fulfillment.
Augustine wavers between thinking that Plato must have had some
acquaintance with Israel's sacred books, and thinking that the sound parts of

48. Chappell, "Bernard Williams."
49. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 8.11.
50. Ibid.
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Plato's teachings about divine and human existence and goodness were made
known to the philosopher by God in that broad sense of "revelation" which
Paul puts near the beginning of his letter to Rome: "what can be known about
God has been manifested among them; in fact God has manifested it, for his
invisible realities, indeed his power and divineness, have from the [time of]
the world's creation" -that is, universally-"been made visible to [human]
understanding through his created works."'" To which Paul adds, on the next
page, "when nations that do not have the Law [revealed to Moses and the
prophets of Israel] nevertheless do by nature what the Law [summed up in the
Ten Commandments] requires, they... show that what the Law requires is
written on their hearts, to which their conscience testifies."52 Here "heart" and
"conscience" refer to the same reality-the activities of human reason-which
the earlier passage called "understanding."
The "Revelation" in this paper's title is that body of teachings that
identifies itself as transmitted by God to a particular people by the series of
intermediaries we call Moses and the prophets and completed by all that Jesus
of Nazareth said and did as witnessed and witnessed to by his apostolic
disciples. It is a faith-a body of teachings and practices-which affirms that
its foundations are established (demonstr[ata])by reason,53 that its accounts
of the life and deeds of Jesus are true, sincere, historicalin character even
while keeping to the style of preaching,54 and that the moral precepts it teaches
are valid for all people everywhere and accessible to everyone's understanding
and fully rational acceptance. In relation to those truths of faith (including
moral truths) which are knowable by reason without revelation and faith, what
divine revelation does is enable them to be known in a way which surpasses
unaided reason in accessibility, certainty, and freedom from error."
Morality (if you like, ethics and conscience) precedes faith in two important
ways. It is by love of truth-by that responsiveness to the desirability of
knowledge which I was recalling a little earlier-that one (anyone) is moved
to ask questions about the source of the world's existence, and of its
astounding processes of orderly evolution and its stably and thus scientifically
accessible orderliness, and to seek a really adequate explanation for these
overarching realities of existence and orderliness as well as for the more
specific realities studied by science and history. The moral obligation to seek
such knowledge, or at least to be receptive to it when it comes one's way, and
51. Ibid., 8.12; Romans 1: 19-20.
52. Romans 2: 14-15.
53. Vatican I, DeiFilius(Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith) (1870), c. 4 (D-S
3019): foundations, but not its whole content (D-S 3041).
54. Vatican II, Dei Verbum (Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation), sec. 19.
55. Dei Filiusc. 2 (D-S 3005).
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in either case to act upon what one has rationally judged to be true, turns out
to be a compelling motivation to acceptance of a revelation whose content in
part confirms reason's findings but in part far exceeds, without contradicting,
what can be known by reason unaided by revelation. So this obligation is a
part of naturalmorality, prior to religious faith.56
And ethics precedes faith in a second way. Revelation, in the sense I am
concerned with, has been conveyed by particular human persons, most notably
by this Jesus. The necessary judgment that he, his forerunners, and those who
preached and wrote about him were persons of truth and not impostures, is a
judgment with various foundational elements, not least-as Aquinas's review
of these elements makes clear-his and (in more mixed ways) their manifest
personal virtue and the inherent excellence of the way of life he proposes to
us.57 A prophet whose message is mixed with self-serving permissions for
acts of lust, hatred and vengeance thereby not only rivets immorality, injustice
and intimidatory menace into the permanent content of any faith he (or she)
founds, but also shows his (or her) message to be unworthy of belief. 8 (And
here it is worth recalling that in the teaching of the community of faith
founded by Christ, public revelation is closed with the age of the apostles, so
that "no new public revelation is to be expected" thereafter,59 a teaching of
faith which entails that any later proclamation of a subsequent revelation
proposed to all must be taken to be a delusion or an imposture.)
Revelation, then, is a remarkable evidencing of truths universal in their
significance and application to all human persons, by really particular,
unrepeatable historical events and choices. To the reasonable assessment and
appropriation of these evidences, philosophy, however soundly done, can be
no more than a preparation and then an ancillary means, among others, of
clarification, and of some conceptual contributions to "the growth in understanding of the words and realities handed on [by traditio] from the
apostles." 6 ° This process of handing on involves the adoption of the revealed
truths into particular human cultures which it more or less reforms but does
not obliterate. Some elements of the reform are in themselves cultural, for
some elements of revelation are themselves cultural, that is, the product of
human choices that could morally have been rightfully different. The
paradigm of an element which is in this way both cultural and universal is the
56. As is stated in Vatican II, DignitatisHumanae (Declaration on Religious Liberty,
1965), sec. 2.3.
57. See Aquinas, 320-21. Other leading elements in Aquinas' list are the miracles worked
by Christ, and the self-sacrificial heroism of his apostles and other witnesses.
58. See Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, I, c. 6.
59. Dei Verbum, sec. 4.
60. Dei Verbum, sec. 8.
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Lord's Prayer (PaterNoster.. .Our Father), established by the choice of a
particular human individual and referring, as it does, to a cultural artifact
(bread) that is not inherent in the natural world, not required by reason, and
not universal.
The two-way inter-dependence between revelation and reason includes this:
that the moral precepts of the Catholic faith are understood by the Church
as-and indeed are--also,at the same time, truths ofpublic reason, accessible
to any reasonable person even if and when defacto widely rejected. Like the
rational preambles to faith, such as Plato's, Aristotle's, or Aquinas's proofs
of the existence of God,6 or the refutation of Hume's sophistries about the
possibility and knowability of miracles,62 these ethical positions and their
political applications are matter for open public debate, to be proposed and
defended as defensible and acceptable without appeal to the authority of
revelation or its author. Those believers who accept them simply on faith,
lacking the ability, education or leisure to appropriate them by unaided reason,
can reasonably rely on them in making political decisions, without needing to
appeal to the "Proviso" that John Rawls belatedly introduced into his "liberal"
but highly restrictive theory of public reason when he said we can appeal to
religious considerations "provided that, in due course, we give [what he calls]
properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our [religious]
doctrine is said to support."63 Christians of the central tradition do not have to
hope that "in due course" such public reasons will become available; if a
moral teaching is proposed as a matter of doctrine in their tradition, public
reasons both including and supportive of that very position are already
available.
The position I have just stated is part of the general position about revelation that it clarifies and confirms God-related propositions and judgments of
reason, including moral/ethical judgments about the good for human persons.
And this, at least in anticipatory outline, is what is suggested by Plato's
philosophical thesis that perception of the divine archetype and cause of all
human good enables those who have that perception-that glimpse of
understanding-to judge better about the issues of individual, social and
political life.
61. On the main lines of some of the many proposed by Aquinas, see Aquinas, 298-304.
62. See e.g., "Hume on Miracles," Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion,
PhilosophyandEthicsby G.E.M Anscombe, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Exeter, U.K.,
and Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2008), 40-48; Finnis, "HistoricalConsciousness"
and TheologicalFoundations,Etienne Gilson Lecture No. 15 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1992).
63. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999),
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IV
If practical reason finds its master moral principle in the ideal of integral
or universal human fulfillment, and if the revelation I have been discussing
identifies and is transmitted in a universal (that is, "catholic") human society
("the new and universal Israel")' whose teachings include the proposition that
all created sub-personal goods or resources have a "universal destination,"65
and if both reason and this religion endorse the contemporary moral-political
consensus articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
the question fairly arises: What should we think about "universalism" in
political theory, and about "cosmopolitan" duties ofjustice? Those are labels
for the thesis that whatever duties of and rights to assistance we owe to our
neighbors (say, our fellow citizens) must be owed in equal measure to all
persons everywhere. How might that thesis be applied? Take just one of the
many ways in which that question might be posed:6 6 Is it ever right to discriminate (distinguish in treatment) between persons, at our borders, because
this person is a national, a citizen, and therefore may certainly enter, but that
person is not and therefore may perhaps not?
That question was approached independently and with varying explicitness
addressed, in 1993, by two persons, Karol Wojtyla and John Rawls, who had
each reflected long on inter-personal ethics; and each later wrote up and
published his response. In his Memory and Identity, appearing within two
weeks of his death in 2005, Wojtyla says: "The term 'nation' designates a
community based in a given territory and distinguished from other nations by
its culture. Catholic social doctrine holds that the family and the nation are
both natural societies, not the product of mere convention. Therefore, in

64. John Paul II, Memory andIdentity (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 81.
65. Catechism of the Catholic Church, under the heading "The universal destination and
the private ownership of goods," says (sec. 2402): "In the beginning God entrusted the earth and
its resources to the common stewardship of mankind to take care of them, master them by labor,
and enjoy their fruits. The goods of creation are destined for the whole human race. However,
the earth is divided up among men to assure the security of their lives, endangered by poverty
and threatened by violence. The appropriation of property is legitimate for guaranteeing the
freedom and dignity of persons and for helping each of them to meet his basic needs and the
needs of those in his charge. It should allow for a natural solidarity to develop between men.
2403: The right to private property, acquired by work or received from others by inheritance or
gift, does not do away with the original gift of the earth to the whole of mankind. The universal
destination of goods remains primordial, even if the promotion of the common good requires
respect for the right to private property and its exercise."
66. See the three papers cited infra n. 81, and see n. 77 on the most grave and searching
question for contemporary political theory.
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human history, they cannot be replacedby anything else."67 The right way of
avoiding unhealthy nationalism is, he says, "through patriotism. Whereas
nationalism involves recognizing and pursuing the good of one's own nation
alone, without regard to the rights of others, patriotism... is a love of one's
native land that accords rights to all other nations equal to those claimed for
one's own."68 For love of one's native land is well grounded:
[T]he native land (or fatherland [patria])is in some ways to be identified with
patrimony, that is, the totality of good bequeathedto us by ourforefathers. In
this context ... one frequently hears the expression 'motherland.' Through personal
experience we all know to what extent the transmission of our spiritual patrimony
takes place through our mothers. Our native land isthus our heritage and it is also
the whole patrimony derived from that heritage...the land, the territory, but more
importantly.. .the values and the spiritual content that go to make up the culture of
a given nation.69
67. Memory andIdentity, 77-8 (emphasis added); likewise 75. See also Vatican II, Decree
Ad Gentes (7 December, 1965), sec. 21: "[Christian lay people] belong to the nation in which
they were born. They have begun to share in its cultural treasures by means of their education.
They are joined in its life by manifold social ties... They feel its problems as their very own...
they must give expression to this [Christian] newness of life in the social and cultural framework
of their own homeland [patriae],according to the traditions of their own nation, a culture which
they should get to know, heal, preserve, develop in accordance with contemporary conditions,
and finally perfect in Christ."
68. Memory & Identity, 75. For the background in earlier forceful papal teaching on
patriotism, see John J. Wright [later Cardinal Wright], NationalPatriotismin PapalTeaching
(Westminster, MD: Newman Bookshop, 1943). Wright shows how, in this extended body of
teachings, strongly supportive of a not unconditional patriotism, the elements constitutive of the
patriaand the nation are primarily "cultural, historical and religious traditions," with shared
language given a certain priority in Wright's exposition, and the shared [love of] "this our native

land" firmly included, and the upshot being a certain shared mentalit6: ibid., 56-66. Wright's
arguments (ibid., 28-51) for discounting certain other factors, not least what Rawls (quoting
Mill) will list as "race, descent" (see at n. 72 below), are in some tension with his (Wright's)
general account.
69. Ibid., 66 (emphasis added). Here and elsewhere Wojtyla refers to and quotes (p. 96-7)
from his papal address of 2 June 1980 to UNESCO, especially "concerning the right of the
nation to the foundation of its culture and its future... a stable element of human experience and
of the humanistic perspective of man's development... a fundamental sovereignty of society
which is manifested in the culture of the nation.. .through which, at the same time, man is
supremely sovereign." This was taken up again by Pope Benedict XVI in his address to the
bishops of France on 14 September 2008: "I am convinced, in fact, that nations must never
allow what gives them their particular identity to disappear. The fact that different members of
the same family have the same father and mother does not mean that they are undifferentiated
subjects: they are actually persons with their own individuality. The same is true for countries,
which must take care to preserve and develop their particular culture, without ever allowing it
to be absorbed by others or swamped in a dull uniformity. 'The Nation is in fact'-to take up
the words of Pope John Paul II-'the great community of men who are united by various ties,
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John Rawls's far-reaching theory of universal justice denies that a justice
universal in its reach is cosmopolitan in its content, that all persons everywhere have equal basic rights, entitlements and liberties.7 ° Instead it speaks
ofjustice--equal rights, etc.-between peoples, and within each people, but
not directly as between all the individuals in the world as if the world were
one people.
Rawls uses "a people" to refer to what John Paul H and John Stuart Mill
and most people call a nation.7 Like John Paul II and Mill, he takes shared
culture to be central to the reality of a particular people. He analyzes this
cultural reality into (a) first, and primarily, the members of this people being
"united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between
them and others," which (b) "make them cooperate with each other more
willingly than with other people," and (c) may result from various causes,
such as commonality of race, descent, language, and religion but "strongest
of all is identity of political antecedents.. .of national history, and consequent
community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and
regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."72 Then he articulates
the legitimate fundamental interests of peoples: their political independence
and their free culture; the security, territory and well-being of their citizens;
and "their proper self-respect of themselves as a people, resting on their
common awareness of their trials during their history and of their culture with
its accomplishments." 73
but above all, precisely by culture. The Nation exists 'through' culture and 'for' culture, and it
is therefore the great educator of men in order that they may 'be more' in the community'
(Address to UNESCO, 2 June 1980, no. 14)" (http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvi/
speeches/2008/september/documents/hfben-xvi spe.20080914_lourdes-vescovi-en.html).
70. See Law ofPeoples, 82-5. The present article's discussion of Rawls does not touch at
all on the question whether he was justified in refusing to extend from the internal arrangements
of political communities to the worldwide community of all persons that principle of justice
most distinctive of his A Theory of Justice, namely the "difference principle," that all social
decisions (at least about the basic structure of society) should improve as far as possible the
wellbeing of the worst-off group in the state. Forbidding immigration would be (in principle,
and on certain conditions) compatible with accepting the very demanding requirements of a
"global difference principle." But in practice it would require world government, which again
might not abolish boundaries-but would certainly relativize boundaries as it dissolved all
conceptions of nationality as for some purposes decisive.
71. See Law ofPeoples, v, 23-5.
72. Ibid., 23 n. 17 quoting J.S. Mill, Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment(1862),
chap. 16. For Rawls's tentative speculation about how far all these elements are necessary for
a just constitutional regime, see Law of Peoples, 24-5.
73. Ibid., 34. For the implications of this kind of reality for a "multiculturalist" politics, see
my critical engagement with Joseph Raz's essays on multiculturalism (e.g., one cited infra at n.
79), in Finnis, "Universality, Personal and Social Identity, and Law," Oxford Legal Studies
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Does not the ethical legitimacy of these fundamental interests suffice to
legitimate the maintenance of boundaries and the concomitant limitation of(or
right to limit) immigration? Rawls does not consider that question. Instead
he grounds the right to limit immigration on the Aristotelian argument for the
justice of the institution of property, whereby parts of the world's resources
including land are appropriated to a particular person or group of persons: the
argument that an asset tends to deteriorate "unless a definite agent is given
responsibility for maintaining [it] and bears the loss for not doing so."74
Rawls is right, I think, to link the justice of boundaries with the justice of
property." Property rights-at whose core is the right to exclude others from
free use of one's property-are well understood in the main tradition to be
qualified both by their purpose of benefiting not merely the owners or other
holders but in one way or another the whole community, and by their liability
to being overridden in situations of real necessity. But Rawls uses a
particularly thin version of Aristotle's argument about the purpose of property
systems, an argument made even thinner by Rawls's focus on maintaining the
territory "and its environmental integrity,"76 as if for their own sake rather
than for the sustenance and flourishing of those who cultivate it and those
within and without who consume its fruits.77 Only in a footnote does he
Research Paper No. 05/2008: http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1094277, part
Ill.
74. Law of Peoples, 39; also 8.
75. This is not to say that national territory is best understood as a form of property: see
Samuel Freeman, "Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples," in Rawls 's Law of Peoples:A
Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell,
2006), 243-260, 247-8.
76. Law of Peoples, 38-9.
77. Cf. Finnis, "Universality, Personal and Social Identity, and Law," part IV: "Is there a
more grave and searching question for a contemporary political and legal theory than this...:
Do people (perhaps the people, the whole population) of some areas of the world have a right,
in justice, to choose to emigrate from those areas and immigrate into another country of their
preference-a right such that it would be an injustice for the authorities or people of that other
The question
country to refuse to accept them into the territory as at least potential citizens? ...
is not altogether unlike the question that has always faced the Church in relation to the rich:
Does Dives have an obligation in justice to let the poor satisfy their needs or desires by taking
from his property as they select? [Luke 6:19-31 ] Does he have rather an obligation to distribute
to the poor, on his own initiative and preferences as owner, all the resources he holds in excess
of what he needs to maintain himself, his family and close dependants? Or is he entitled to
devote the excess, so defined, to pursuing his professional or skilled vocation, educating his
children, supporting the institutions and arrangements appropriate to maintaining the Rule of
Law, the advancement of knowledge, architectural and other glories of God, and so forth? Dire
emergency and famine aside, may he not treat as superflua, dedicated to relief of the poor, only
what is left after contributing reasonably to these "vocational" good works? Saintly
philosophers such as St. Thomas, like the universal church's most authorized pastors and
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observe that "another reason for limiting immigration is to protect a people's
political culture and its constitutional principles."78 He might very
appropriately have brought to bear, right here, his own judgment that a good
political culture will itself be dependent on what he calls "common
sympathies," shared by this people because of its shared memories and
identity. Such shared sympathies, and the willingness to cooperate that they
encourage, he might well have called, with Aristotle, civic friendship or, with
John Paul II, solidarity within the framework of patriotism. Modem political
experience and reflection suggests that without a real and fairly pervasive
sharing of sympathies, nothing short of massive state coercion79 will suffice
to ensure that people's loyalties to their family and its wealth and other
interests are transcended sufficiently to sustain what we call a welfare state."0
teachers, have favored the last of these possible answers. The right of a particular political
community's members, acting through its government and law, to exclude from entry or
residence all non-members whose residing would directly or indirectly pose a risk to that
community's common good is a right similar in ground and structure to the rights of exclusion
and exclusionary use which are central to dominium and other analogous rights of property or
ownership. Both kinds of right must be understood and exercised compatibly with the truths,
first [1] that the Earth belongs to all, and second [2] that it can be and almost universally is
reasonable, indeed required by justice, to divide it up and appropriate its material resources and
its territories to some for their exclusionary use. For, as to resources: their cultivation and
management will be more fruitful in economic and moral goods than if they were tended as
common or as publicly owned. And, as to the territories of states: the culture, law and politics
carried forward on them will be more human, adequate, and just than if carried on (a) in a
context of deep disharmony among their inhabitants and/or (b) where those preconditions for
law (and much else) which Raz identified for us [in his essays on national self-determination
and on multiculturalism] are not in place or would be negated by the entry ofmany and different
peoples. For, in turn, immigration ofsuch a scale or kind can overwhelm or outrun assimilation,
dissipate the general (near unanimous) "sense" (including intelligently willed disposition) of
identification with the country, nation, state, government and law that our forebearers built upon
this land, and thereby bring about the elimination or non-fulfilment of the preconditions for
peace, welfare and good government. So, [1] since the Earth belongs to all, the right of exclusion must be subject to override by the kind of real necessity that in our tradition's teaching, as
articulated by St. Thomas, makes property revert to common availability to the extent required
to relieve such necessity. [Aquinas 191-6] That kind of override is found in the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 as extended temporally and geographically by Protocol
of 1967. But [2] as that Convention shows in its determinationes[specifications or particularizations] of the universal right of refuge, the exercise of even this fundamental right is by no means
unconditional, and requires, among other things, that the refugee conform to our (just) laws and
regulations as well as to (just) measures taken for the maintenance of our public order."
78. Law of Peoples,39 n. 48.
79. "Extensive force and coercion": Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism," Ratio Juris 11(1998):
193-205, 202.
80. And, to recall Mill's point, such sympathies are particular to the members of this
people; as sympathies, they "do not exist between them and others." Plato was so impressed
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Since the maintenance of a welfare state within the framework of the rule of
law is a major component of the common good and a strong requirement of
justice, it will be a rather strong requirement of justice-in conditions
favorable to mass movement-that immigration be regulated by discriminating
among some kinds of non-nationals and other kinds, with a view to preserving
one's people from the destruction or corrosion of these various cultural and
dispositional preconditions for a just and stable common good.8
Two additional points about Rawls's defence of the ethics of maintaining
strong, secure nations. They are points of special importance, I think, in the
face of the ever more indiscriminate use by courts and activists of an antidiscrimination principle, which functions rather like a new communism.82 The
first point to be made is that Rawls's defence of nations, which is significant
because it cuts against what many assumed were the implications of his
original theory of justice, depends not only on factual assumptions, i.e.,
judgments, about the conditions under which the common good can be
maintained but also on strongly (albeit highly plausible) substantive and
positive evaluations. Think particularly of his thesis that it is right, or at least
often right, for a people to be united in judging that their historic culture has
been and is, at least substantially, a good one-that it has "accomplishments"
on which they can look with legitimate "amour propre."83 So, secondly,
by the problem of overcoming exclusive family and/or tribal loyalties that, with due hesitations,
but repeatedly, he postulated an ideal of a community-wide sharing of women and children, so
that (as a profound modem interpreter puts it) "the profound sentiments arising from sex
relations, as well as the parent-child relations, will no longer be contained in the small family
but will be communized" (Plato's word: koinoneo). See Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle,
volume 3 of Order andHistory (Baton Rouge and London, Louisiana State University Press,
1957, 1985), 118. Plato himself was aware of the extremism of this communist (or excessively
universalist) proposal; Aristotle's criticisms of it (see Politics 2.1-2: 1260b37-1264b3;
Voegelin, Plato andAristotle, 319-22; Finnis, NaturalLaw and Natural Rights, 144-7, 158)
enhance the efficiency argument for private property with elements relating to independence,
autonomy and generosity. These elements are not included in the efficiency argument later
deployed by Aquinas and, though thinly, as we have seen, by Rawls. But they are present in
mutated form in one part of Leo XIII's defence of property in his encyclical letter, Rerum
Novarum (15 May 1891), secs. 13-15.
81. Finnis, "Nationality, Alienage and Constitutional Principle," Law QuarterlyReview123
(2007): 417-45; "Discriminating between Faiths: A Case of Extreme Speech?," Extreme Speech
andDemocracy, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
428-39; and "Universality, Personal and Social Identity, & Law". Neither that set ofessays nor
this section of the present paper provide a sufficiently comprehensive consideration of the
questions of justice and charity at stake in large-scale immigration. But I doubt that such a
consideration would render unimportant the considerations advanced in those essays and the
present article.
82. On one old kind of communism, see above, n. 80.
83. Law of Peoples, 34 ("what Rousseau call amourpropre").
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Rawls's affirmation ofthe necessity and legitimacy of this particular, substantive evaluation by the people (or the dominant portion of them) significantly
limits-if not eliminates-the application of two of the more famous theses
that together are central to his account of "public reason." The first is that a
liberal society (the main one of only two legitimate forms of nation) has no
"comprehensive conception of the good;" 4 and the second is that his own
theory of "political liberalism" is not put forward as true but as an exercise in
"constructivism."85 His willingness to affirm what amounts to the necessity
of patriotic evaluations makes yet more visible how much his programmatic
constructivist deflation of such affirmations shares with the skeptical "postmodem" deniers of truth, whose self-refutatory approach to philosophy is
nicely caught by Bernard Williams, paraphrasing Alasdair Maclntyre genially
noting "the awkwardness that inevitably catches up with the writer.. .who
holds up before the reader's lens a sign saying that something is true or
plausible or worth considering [or, we may add, legitimate], and then tries to
vacate the spot before the shutter clicks."86
V
In the foregoing reflections on the pre-conditions for the degree of unity (as
opposed to diversity) necessary for the rule of law and a welfare state, the
family figures as source, or at least locus, of an acute, standing threat to the
common good of the polity. So it is necessary to add that it seems equally
clear that those same preconditions include appropriate sound nurturing of
children within families flourishing as families. Family as threat to the
political common good is only the perversion of family as foundation of that
common good. This foundational significance doubtless includes various
elements, biological, psychological, and cultural. So, for example: If the
84. Ibid. But this is no more than a summary recall of the elaborate constructivist theory
pf"public reason" articulated by Rawls in PoliticalLiberalism ([ 1993], 1996), where concern
for the truth of moral and political principles is replaced by a postulated obligation to make
one's political judgments and decisions within the confines of a supposed overlapping and
stable consensus of "all reasonable people" or at least of"a sizable body of adherents in a more
or less just constitutional regime" (ibid., 15).
85. "Constructivism" here signifies a proposal to replace the question of a proposition's
truth or falsity with the question whether the proposition has been arrived at by an appropriate
"procedure of construction" (ibid., 90) such as, in the context of Rawls's A Theory ofJustice
(that is, of justice within political communities) a (postulated} agreement within an "original
position," or, in the same context as reconceived in Political Liberalism, within the
"overlapping consensus." See generally Finnis, "Public Reason, Abortion and Cloning,"
Valparaiso University Law Review 32 (1998): 361-82.
86. Truth and Truthfulness, 19.
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shared culture so important to a state's stability and fruitfulness for good is to
be maintained, it must be transmitted in the first instance by the nurturing of
children within their families. Neither political nor legal theory can neglect,
or pass over as if embarrassed by, the thesis given a declaratory articulation
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16(3): "The family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State." To call the family (or with John Paul II, the state)
"natural" is not, primarily, to say that it exists by necessity, or by instinct or
sub-rational inclination. Rather it is to say, above all, that the possibility of
establishing, maintaining, and living in a family can easily be understood to
be an object of choices that is desirable because fulfilling, not only as a means
to other ends but in itself, inherently 7 -and fulfilling not only for the
choosers but for many others, especially those whose very existence is an
effect of such choices.
Despite Plato's dalliance with a communism of wives and children as
solution to the problem created for political communities by family loyalty,
both he and that communism's critic, Aristotle, thought their way through to
an understanding, real albeit not flawless, that family is essential to the
soundness of the polis, marriage is essential to the family, and sex acts are
meaningful and ethically sound only in the context of marriage. One measure
of the perhaps surprising extent of Plato's clarity on these matters: the leading
scholarly study of love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle in the last thirty
years concluded, with manifest reluctance, that the sex ethics of Plato, Pope
Paul VI and Pope John Paul II were essentially identical.88 (As for Aristotle,
his prime example of the category of acts always wrong in themselves is
adultery.)89 Four centuries later, around the end of the first century A.D. but
independently of Jewish and Christian influences, we find the Roman Stoic
87. As Aquinas never tires of saying, X's nature is understood by understanding its
capacities, which are understood by their act(uation)s, which are understood by reference to
their objects. See Aquinas, 29-32.
88. Anthony W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), 229-35, especially 233, 235; Finnis, "Law, Morality, and 'Sexual Orientation',"
Notre Dame Law Review 69 (1994): 1049-76, 1060, and see 1057-63 for Plato's views as a
whole. For brief responses to some responses to that article, see the later version: Finnis, "Law,
Morality, and 'Sexual Orientation'," Notre Dame JournalofLaw, Ethicsand Public Policy 9
(1995): 11-39, 18-26. What the predicate "is natural" means in relation to the family is equally
what the predicate "is unnatural" asserts is opposed or violated, in Plato's repeated description
of homosexual acts as kata physin, contrary to nature, unnatural: e.g., Phaedrus, 251 a, Laws
636c, 836, 838, 841.
89. Nicomachean Ethics 2.6: 1107a9-17; also Eudemian Ethics 2.3: 1221b20-22; for the
questionableness of the common opinion that these passages merely make a linguistic and thus
tautologous point about the pejorative word "adultery," see Finnis, Moral Absolutes, 31-2.
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philosopher Musonius Rufus and the Greek polymath Plutarch articulating
with clarity the two essential elements of the basic human good of marriage:
procreation/parenthood and friendship between husband and wife, who act as
equals in the acts of bodily union by which they experience, actualize and
express both those elements together.90 Does it not once again appear that
revelation was needed for nothing more (nor less) that this: that its
teachings-here its teachings on marriage9 -make more widely and stably
available truths which were always accessibleto natural reason and had in fact
been affirmed by philosophical reflection and even, to some extent, by some
cultures which had not been informed by that revelation?
To answer that question with appropriate generality, one should go back to
what Bernard Williams (like Hume and Kant and so many other philosophers)
missed, the first principles of practical reason which direct us towards the
basic intelligible human goods, goods that are in countless ways both the
source of all intelligibility and reasonableness in our choices, and the outline
of human flourishing---of human nature in its full actuation. Each of these
first principles is, so to speak, transparentfor the human persons in whom
such good can be actualized, so transparent that it is, in truth, those persons
for whose sake we are responding when we respond at all to the summons and
direction of those principles.92 But this actualization of universals does not
exhaust the reality of what is present in such flourishing. Specificity and
particularity always add to what is more universal or generic.93 Love responds
to all that is there in the beloved; it responds to the passing stranger in the
desert,94 but makes its necessarily exclusive commitments, and has its
necessarily discriminatory loyalty, to this my people or my friend. But to say
this is still to speak too generally. Human nature, as the child can see in its
parents, is not quite complete (whether in capacities, dispositions or fulfillments) in either male or female. That is why one of the basic human goods is
marriage. It is also why-since marriage has the specific kind of act in which
it can particularly be realized, experienced and expressed-there is a part of
ethics which particularly concerns the conditions under which choosing
90. See "Law, Morality and 'Sexual Orientation'," 1062-5; 24-30.
91. John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation, Familiaris Consortio (22 November 1981),
especially sec. 29, reaffirming the key teaching in Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Humanae Vitae
(25 July 1968), secs. 9, 11, 12.
92. See Finnis, "Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited," American Journal of
Jurisprudence50 (2005): 109-131, 131.
93. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2.26, 42.
94. See Anscombe, Faith in a HardGround, 234: "there are lesser friendships: there are
friendships of advantage or pleasure, the friendships of fellows in an association, of fellow
workers and of fellow citizens-and also of fellow me, as would make its appearance if fear did
not when two humans alone find one another in the desert."
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behaviour that is or might be of that kind respects that universal good
sufficiently to be judged reasonable and right." The conditions, as everyone
knows, are demanding enough for revelation to be needed to confirm, and in
some lesser measure to clarify, deepen and extend, what the most careful
thinkers of Greece and Rome could recognize and teach, even in the midst of
a culture devoted, in ways paralleled and surpassed in our day, to shadows in
the Cave.

95. See Finnis, "Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good," The Monist 91/3 (2008): 396-414;
Aquinas, 143-54; "The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some
Philosophical and Historical Observations,"AmericanJournalofJurisprudence42 (1997): 97134.

